Enforced Diaspora: The Fate of Italian Prisoners of War during the Second World War by Moore, B.
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ENFORCED DIASPORA: THE FATE OF ITALIAN PRISONERS-OF-
WAR DURING THE SECOND WORLD WAR 
 
By the end of the war in Europe in 1945, more than one million Italian servicemen had 
become prisoners of war and dispersed across Europe, North America, South Africa, India, 
Asiatic Russia and Australia by their various captors. They had been taken captive in North 
Africa, Abyssinia and the Italian mainland by the British and Americans, and on the Eastern 
&ƌŽŶƚďǇƚŚĞ^ŽǀŝĞƚhŶŝŽŶ ?,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ƚŚĞŝƌĐŽƵŶƚƌǇ ?ƐƐƵƌƌĞŶĚĞƌĂŶĚƌĞinvention as an Allied 
co-belligerent after September 1943 meant that large sections of the Italian armed forces 
still in the field had the dubious distinction of being interned and then utilised by their 
erstwhile German allies. There is already an extensive literature on the policies of individual 
Western captor powers, as well as publications emanating from Italian scholars,
1
 but this 
study is the first attempt to compare these policies as they affected all the Italians taken 
prisoner of war during the conflict. It seeks to explain how the extensive prisoner diaspora 
came about and how the fate of these men was dictated primarily by a mixture of economic 
and security imperatives particular to each of the captor powers involved; imperatives that 
shifted over time as the war situation itself changed. It also reflects on the relative 
subordination of political considerations as factors in ƚŚĞƉƌŝƐŽŶĞƌƐ ?ƚƌĞĂƚŵĞŶƚ ?both during 
and after the cessation of hostilities and the sometimes limited efficacy of international 
conventions and the laws of war in offering them protection.  
/ƚĂůǇ ?ƐĞŶƚƌǇ into the war in June 1940 immediately put her colonial possessions in 
North and East Africa into the front line. A pre-emptive assault on Egypt by the Italian Tenth 
Army led by Marshal Rudolfo Graziani in September 1940 soon ground to a halt and a British 
counterattack led to the complete destruction of more than nine divisions and the capture 
of approximately 133,000 prisoners.
2
 A similar story was played out in Abyssinia and Italian 
Somaliland which together yielded a further 64,000 captives in early 1941. So great and so 
unexpected was the scale of these victories that the officers in charge were initially unable 
to provide accurate prisoner numbers. However, this overwhelming success brought its own 
problems for the British Commander-in-Chief, General Wavell. Egypt itself was by no means 
politically secure and the provision of food, guards, and suitable accommodation for so 
many enemies so close to a fluid war zone could not be guaranteed.  Various imperial 
territories were asked to help but in the meantime Wavell unilaterally sent a first tranche of 
5,000 Italian officers to India. Subsequent formal agreements with the governments of 
imperial territories meant that more prisoners held in Egypt were soon evacuated by sea via 
Suez to India, South Africa and Australia while those in East Africa were taken south into 
Kenya.
3
 The speed of their evacuation was largely determined by the availability of suitable 
transport but even in January 1941, London was already pressing for prisoners to be used as 
ůĂďŽƵƌ ďĞŚŝŶĚ ƚŚĞ ůŝŶĞƐ ĂŶĚ ĂƐ ƐƵďƐƚŝƚƵƚĞƐ ĨŽƌ ƉŝŽŶĞĞƌ ĐŽŵƉĂŶŝĞƐ ? /Ŷ ƐƉŝƚĞ ŽĨ tĂǀĞůů ?Ɛ
2 
 
reservations, February 1941 saw the formation of 18 prisoner-of-war labour companies for 
battlefield salvage work, although the mass mobilisation of European Italians as labour was 
avoided by the use of Libyans who had been captured serving as Italian colonial troops.
4
  
This tension between security concerns on the one hand, and the need to make the 
prisoners productive on the other was also apparent in the imperial territories that acted as 
detaining powers. The majority of the captured officers (who could not be required to work 
under the terms of the Geneva Convention) were sent to India, but both the Union of South 
Africa and Australia saw the captives as a welcome addition to an overstretched domestic 
civilian labour market. Thus, for example, 90% of the first 20,000 Italians sent to South 
Africa were prioritised for employment in road building and agricultural work.
5
 In this 
respect, the Union had some advantages, being well away from war zones and, with a very 
small local Italian community, the only real threat from the prisoners came from the 
possibility of escape or collusion with anti-Allied Afrikaners. Indeed, this provides the 
explanation for the large numbers of Italians who were ultimately sent there, coupled with 
the fact that the Union authorities were unwilling to act as hosts for German prisoners 
evacuated from North Africa in 1942 and 1943 because of the greater potential security 
threat they presented. 
6
 
Initial British perceptions that most captured Italians were uncommitted to Fascism 
and pleased to be out of the war seem to have been borne out; so much so that in spite of 
security concerns, the import of Italian prisoners to the United Kingdom was being actively 
discussed early in 1941 to alleviate a grievous shortage of labour on the home front. The 
first contingents of a planned 25,000 arrived on British soil in July of that year to be held in 
purpose-built camps. Optimum use of their labour required maximum flexibility and 
mobility. Accommodating men in camps had only limited value as too much time was taken 
in moving them to where they were actually needed, and small labour companies were soon 
being used with minimal guarding. Ultimately, prisoners were billeted on individual farms 
where their labour could best be utilised. Thus even in a country where security concerns 
were supposedly paramount, the insatiable demand for labour overrode many 
considerations, although it should be said that Italians brought to the United Kingdom were 
more carefully screened for fascist sympathisers than those sent to other parts of the 
Empire.
7
 However, much the same pattern was evident there too, with reliable prisoners 
increasingly deployed with few, if any, guards.   
In general terms, the British Imperial authorities looked to adhere to the spirit if not 
the letter of the Geneva Convention at all times, in spite of some difficulties in 
communication with their counterparts in Rome.
8
 Thus prisoners were generally employed 
only on work with no direct relation to the war effort  W primarily agriculture, forestry and 
civil construction projects - although there were examples where expediency led to some 
blurring of distinctions. For example, Italians sent to the United Kingdom were used to help 
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build some of the defences for the British naval base at Scapa Flow on Orkney while others 
were drafted in to augment the depleted ranks of non-combatants in the Eighth Army in the 
Middle East as cooks, mess servants and batmen.  As a report in July 1943 made clear, 
Bribes and corruption are, of course, unknown in the British Army [but] that the 
gratitude of a commanding officer to a PW Camp Officer for supplying him with 
several prisoners might sometimes express itself in a bottle of whiskey  or something 
else is beside the point. And so all units with an enterprising [commanding officer], 
authorised to hold PW or not, suffered little or nothing from the prevailing and 
greatly advertised shortage of manpower.
9
  
 
In the United Kingdom, the Italians were extensively employed in agriculture and 
forestry where unskilled labour was in short supply or completely unavailable. Only a very 
small number of officers accompanied the men, and these were nearly all protected 
personnel; medical staff and priests. Elsewhere in the Empire they were put to work on 
major forestry and road-building projects. In Kenya they were utilised to improve the Great 
North Road and by September 1943 the colony played host to 58,112 POWs, many of whom 
latterly found their way into farm work. In South Africa, the Italians could also be found 
contracted out to farmers although the Union government had to be wary of Trade Union 
objections to their deployment. Provision was made for up to 100,000 to be held there but 
the total in September 1943 stood at around 48,320. India ultimately accommodated more 
than 66,000, including more than 11,000 officers. Australia also found space for 4,592 men 
but there were other, smaller groups spread across the British Empire, including over 1,000 
in Persia and Iraq, 578 in West Africa, 60 in Canada, 31 in Jamaica and a further 30 
elsewhere in the Caribbean.
10
 All the figures included naval and air force personnel as well 
as merchant mariners, a factor that may help explain these small numbers in unusual 
locations away from the main theatres of war.  
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Table 1: Italian Prisoners of War in the United Kingdom and Dominions, 15 September 
1943
11
 
Italians Officers Other Ranks Total 
Great Britain 364 76,491 76,855 
Middle East 2,723 56,732 59,455 
Persia and Iraq 5 1,196 1,201 
East Africa 4,938 53,174 58,112 
West Africa 1 577 578 
India 11,029 55,703 66,732 
Australia 473 4,119 4,592 
Canada  60 60 
South Africa 202 48,118 48,320 
Jamaica  31 31 
Caribbean 6 24 30 
    
Total 19,741 296,215 315,966 
 
The United States ? entry into the war resulted in the immediate seizure and 
internment of a few Italian prisoners, but it was not until the beginning of 1943, when US 
forces began the Tunisian campaign, that they made their first large-scale captures. While 
there had been no preconceived plan to utilise prisoners of war, the need to keep combat 
troops supplied meant that Italians were soon drafted in to augment existing French and 
Arab civilian workers. The American military authorities were somewhat wary of using 
Italians more widely, but the imperative of finding labour overcame any reticence and they 
could soon be found deployed in warehousing, transportation, road-building and general 
labouring.
12
 Soon afterwards, Italians inside camps were also put to productive work. The 
conclusion of the war in North Africa led to the surrender of 252,415 German and Italian 
prisoners, a number so great that London and Washington decided to split the responsibility 
for them equally through the so called 50:50 Agreement.
13
 Most of the Germans and around 
50,000 Italians were shipped to the United States but 15,000 Italians and 5,000 Germans 
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were also transferred into French hands, again ostensibly as a labour force, but in practice 
as insurance for any Free French prisoners taken by the Axis who might otherwise have 
been summarily executed as francs-tireurs.
14
 This began a policy for both American and 
British forces where the maximum number of ItalŝĂŶƐ ǁŚŽ ǁĞƌĞ  ‘ŚĂƌŵůĞƐƐ ƚŽ ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?
would be retained to meet the labour needs associated with the build-up to the attack on 
Sicily and the Italian peninsula. 
 This objective was temporarily undermined when, after the fall of Mussolini, Dwight 
D. Eisenhower made a speech directed at the Italian government which intimated that 
Italians captured in Tunisia and thereafter would be repatriated if all the Allied prisoners 
then in Italian hands were safely returned. His words caused some initial panic in British 
circles because of the importance they attached to the Italians as a labour force, but in the 
event, neither London nor Washington had to deliver on this undertaking as many Allied 
prisoners in Italian camps were either handed over to the Germans by their Italian captors 
or were captured as the forces of the Third Reich flooded into the country from the North.
15
 
In any case, it transpired that neither the British nor the American military authorities were 
prepared to give up their captive Italian labour forces even though the speed of the military 
success on Sicily in July 1943 led to another surfeit of prisoners. This embarrassment of 
riches led Eisenhower to disarm and parole 61,658 officers and men of Sicilian origin to help 
with the harvest.
16
 Paroling had been initiated on pragmatic grounds to remove the 
responsibility for feeding and accommodating large numbers of prisoners and it was 
continued once the invasion of the Italian mainland began  W although by this stage there 
was a presumption that any captives taken before the armistice with the Badoglio regime 
was agreed would be kept as prisoners-of-war.
17
 There is no doubt that both the British and 
American authorities had identified the value of Italian prisoners as a labour supply at an 
early stage, both as a substitute for military as well as civilian manpower shortages. The 
ƉƌŝƐŽŶĞƌƐ ?ƌĞůĂƚŝǀĞůĂĐŬŽĨpolitical commitment to the Mussolini regime and general docility 
allowed good use to be made of their services as a means of offsetting the costs of their 
captivity and rendering valuable indirect help to the war effort in Europe, North America 
and the British Empire. 
The confusion over the status of Italians in captivity continued after 8 September 
1943. The domestic credibility of the Badoglio regime rested in large part on getting Italy 
out of the war and getting her soldiers home. While the first had been achieved, albeit at 
considerable cost with large swathes of Northern and Central Italy occupied by her former 
Axis partner, the latter remained unattainable in the face of British and American 
intransigence. The Geneva Convention made no provision for a belligerent changing sides in 
a conflict, but the British were adamant that, whatever the future status of the prisoners, 
they should be regarded as a pool which Allied governments would continue to draw on in 
whatever way would best serve the manpower problem and the wider war effort.
18
  After 
the armistice, attempts were made to negotiate a formal co-belligerency agreement with 
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ĂĚŽŐůŝŽ ?ƐŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ďut without initial success.19 For political reasons, the Allied powers 
wanted to provide some recognition to the Badoglio regime  W in order to enlist its help in 
the liberation and governance of Italy. Washington and London thus promoted the idea of 
co-belligerency as there was no question of the Italians becoming allies overnight, not least 
because that would involve some form of peace settlement  W something that both the 
major powers were keen to avoid.
20
 For their part, the Italians were keen to see their 
soldiers in captivity returned home wherever possible rather than being employed by the 
ůůŝĞƐƚŽƉƌŽƐĞĐƵƚĞƚŚĞǁĂƌĂŐĂŝŶƐƚƚŚĞ'ĞƌŵĂŶƐ ?dŚĞƌĞŝƐŶŽĚŽƵďƚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?Ɛ
legitimacy with the Italian people would have been greatly enhanced if they could have 
shown some tangible benefits for the concessions made.
21
 However, the negotiations ran on 
into April 1944 when the process reached an impasse.
22
 As Harold Macmillan recorded in his 
diary for 4 April 1944: 
There is nothing more I can do. I am advising London to go right ahead with 
organising the Italian prisoners into pioneer battalions and to put them on to work 
which is technically forbidden by the Convention. After all, there is nothing which 
Badoglio can do, except lodge a protest with the protecting power  W Switzerland. I 
do not believe he will do this, especially as he has already agreed to those in North 
Africa being employed on such work.
23
 
 
This last reference was to a demand from Eisenhower to Badoglio on 9 October 1943, just a 
month after the armistice, that Italian prisoners in North Africa could be used as non-
combatant auxiliaries alongside Allied forces. This had been agreed verbally by the Italians 
two days later, although there was some considerable, and perhaps understandable, 
reticence about making the deal public.
24
 
Co-belligerency meant that Italian prisoners prepared to undertake work beyond the 
terms of the Geneva Convention were offered better pay, conditions and the chance of 
early repatriation while remaining as prisoners. A good deal of thought was given to 
civilianising those willing to change status, but this was deemed inadvisable as it would 
remove the command structure and the possibility of using (non-commissioned) officers as 
overseers and supervisors.  In Britain, Italian Labour Battalions were created and deployed 
by various government ministries to carry out essential tasks. While this had important 
ramifications for the use of Italians as substitutes for civilian labour in the United Kingdom 
and its Empire, it also had an impact on the use of prisoners in the war establishment of 
British forces. By early 1944, many thousands of prisoners had been incorporated into 
pioneer units, thus freeing British imperial service manpower for other duties.
25
 By the end 
of the war in Europe, 63% of the 154,000 Italians in the United Kingdom had been 
persuaded to become co-belligerents, although a residual 40,000 or so steadfastly refused 
to succumb to the blandishments of their captors. While there were undoubtedly fascist 
elements among the prisoners who refused to co-operate on ideological grounds, many 
others feared that reprisals would be taken against their families still in northern (German-
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occupied) Italy.
26
 The Americans operated a similar policy of mobilising Italian captives from 
October 1943 onwards into Italian Service Units (ISU) of 250 men, commanded by Italian 
officers and NCOs. Although all prisoners had been notionally screened and categorised as 
secure, doubtful or insecure, this was largely ignored in the rush to use their services and 
only a few officers were given proper investigation and then relied upon to weed out any 
unreliable elements among their men. ISUs were subsequently deployed throughout Tunisia 
and Algeria and undertook all manner of subsidiary roles  W in many cases alongside 
American units.
27
 Latterly some 28,000 were also employed in supporting the invasion of 
Southern France, and in the later stages of the campaign on the Italian mainland. It is worth 
noting that some Italians who had not been taken as prisoners of war were formed into 
Italian Army Service Units (ITI) and deployed by both the British and the Americans. 
However, problems were encountered when they worked alongside volunteer POW units 
and were seen to have better pay and conditions.
28
   
The 50,000 Italians sent to the United States in the spring and summer of 1943 
probably enjoyed the best conditions of any experienced by their comrades in captivity.
29
 
Although there was some disappointment when many of the camps in the United States 
turned out to be in desert states like Texas and Arizona, the overriding memory evoked by 
their experiences was of the quantity and quality of the food the prisoners habitually 
received. An Italian wrote of his arrival in Florence, Arizona: 
When we arrived they took us to the mess hall to eat. We had pasta, meat, fruit and 
dessert. It was truly a wonderful dinner. I first thought it had to be some very special 
occasion, but I soon realized that we were always fed very well.
30
 
 
Most were employed in agriculture; everything from cotton farming to ranching and 
forestry. Although initially employed inside camps, the authorities also wanted to use the 
Italian prisoners more productively, for example in working for private employers as 
contract labourers. Usually supervised by Italian NCOs, they were required to carry papers 
to show that they had been paroled for the purpose.
31
 As with the Italians in British 
captivity, they were offered incentives to join ISUs as non-combatant formations attached 
to US military establishments, led by Italian officers, and wearing Italian uniforms, insignia 
and badges. Some rudimentary screening took place, but only 3,000 of the 50,000 were 
rejected at this stage.
32
 The incentives offered included better conditions, early repatriation 
and the possibility of a return to the US without having to wait for an immigration visa. They 
were also promised that they would not be sent abroad or asked to fight. However, the 
same reservations were evident among these men as with their counterparts in the United 
Kingdom. Some saw it as a moral issue about changing sides when the Allies were still 
fighting Italians in Europe. Others looked at it more pragmatically and were worried about 
reprisals against their families in German-occupied Italy and also about their status as 
soldiers when they were finally returned home.
33
 Nevertheless, around 32,500 ultimately 
joined ISUs and spent the remainder of war working alongside US soldiers.
34
 Only four ISU 
8 
 
units totalling around 1,000 men were sent overseas  W to the United Kingdom and then to 
Normandy to support US troops in NW Europe.
35
  
The final tally of Italians taken captive by the western powers can be seen in the 
table below, although there may be some elements of double counting when compared 
with the table above. Nonetheless, the numbers are substantial and the fact that the 
majority of these prisoners were put to work in some form or another demonstrates their 
benefit both to the Allied war effort and to some aspects of postwar reconstruction.  
Table 2: Italian Statistics for the Total Numbers of Italian POWs in Allied Hands
36
 
Location British Hands US Hands French Hands Total 
Britain 158,029 - - 158,029 
Italy 16,514 20,000 - 36,514 
Gibraltar  541 - - 541 
North Africa 26,638 9,751 37,500 73,889 
West Africa 1,458 - - 1,458 
South Africa 40,285 - - 40,285 
East Africa 42,857 - - 42,857 
Middle East 58,520 - - 58,520 
Canada 59 - - 59 
Jamaica 29 - - 29 
India 33,302 - - 33,302 
Persia & Iraq 2,000 - - 2,000 
Australia 17,657 - - 17,657 
United States - 51,500 - 51,500 
France  - 43,000 - 43,000 
     
TOTAL 397,916 124,251 37,500 559,667 
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The Allies had also hoped that a formal declaration of war by the King against 
Germany in early October 1943  W a decision delayed in the hope that it would follow the 
liberation of Rome  W would lead to some Italian military personnel being deployed in the 
liberation of their country. In fact, some Italians on the mainland were remobilised from the 
end of September onwards but they were drawn from soldiers garrisoned in the southern 
part of the country who were undertrained, ill-equipped, ill-disciplined and had never seen 
active service. The Allies probably regarded these Italian formations as politically more 
important than any military effectiveness they might have possessed, and treated them 
accordingly.
37
 Later, a First Motorised Combat Group comprising 295 officers and 5,387 
other ranks was formed from men who had escaped internment by the Germans and had 
found their way into Allied occupied territory.
38
 Its first engagement came at Monte Lungo, 
where it fought alongside the Americans. Ultimately it grew in strength to around 22,000 
when it was renamed the Corpo Italiano di Liberazione (Italian Liberation Corps) and 
continued to operate alongside Allied soldiers at Monte Cassino and later along the Gothic 
Line.
39
  Initial Allied suspicion of their erstwhile enemies was soon replaced by a grudging 
respect for their abilities as front line troops in the battle to liberate their homeland.  
tŚŝůĞ /ƚĂůǇ ?Ɛ ƚƌĂŶƐŝƚŝŽŶ ĨƌŽŵ ǆŝƐ ƉŽǁĞƌ ƚŽ ĐŽ-belligerent had largely positive 
outcomes for the ideologically uncommitted Italians already in British or American captivity, 
the situation for the Italian forces still deployed against the Allies was problematic in the 
extreme. The terms of the armistice on 8 September 1943 included the provision that the 
Italian Navy and merchant fleets should make their way to Allied controlled ports and the 
Air Force should likewise evacuate to Allied bases. However, this left the Italian Army in the 
peninsula and in the Balkans with few options  W instructed to stop fighting but with no 
orders as to how to deal with their erstwhile German Allies.
40
 As a result of this precipitous 
volte face on the eve of the Allied assault on the Italian mainland, the bulk of the Italian 
Army was rendered inoperative  W although the Allies had some hopes that the Badoglio 
regime might order sabotage actions against the Germans. The Allied commanders did not 
expect to gain much from the surrender beyond the acquisition of the Italian fleet, the use 
of soldiers in ports and to secure lines of communication.
41
 However, there were possible 
strategic advantages to be had elsewhere. The Dodecanese Islands were largely garrisoned 
by Italian troops and it was thought that these might be liberated at little cost if the Italians 
could be persuaded to neutralise the much smaller numbers of Germans there. This hope 
proved illusory as, in the face of German threats, the Italians showed no inclination to act in 
spite of their numerical superiority. Assessing that the assault on the Italian mainland was 
ƚŚĞ ƉƌŝŽƌŝƚǇ ? ŝƐĞŶŚŽǁĞƌ ?Ɛ ĐŽŵŵĂŶĚ ĂďĂŶĚŽŶĞĚ ƚŚĞ ŝƐůĂŶĚƐ ? ůŝďĞƌĂƚŝŽŶ ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ ŽĐĐƵƉǇŝŶŐ
Germans subsequently interned the Italians garrisoned there.
42
  Elsewhere in the Axis 
occupied Mediterranean similar tactics were used to secure control, on at least one 
occasion with devastating consequences.   
10 
 
ĨŽƌĐĞŽĨ  ? ? ? ? ? ? /ƚĂůŝĂŶƐŽŶƚŚĞ ŝƐůĂŶĚŽĨ<ĞĨĂůŽŶŝĂŚĂĚďĞĞŶ  ‘ƌĞŝŶĨŽƌĐĞĚ ?ďǇ  ? ? ? ? ?
Germans in July 1943. At the armistice, the Italian commander, General Antonio Gandin, 
received somewhat vague orders from his superiors to the effect that he should not 
confront the Germans unless threatened by them and should also not make common cause 
with the Allies or with the local Greek partisans. All Italian shipping had left the island as 
part of the armistice agreement, giving him no means of evacuating his soldiers. On 11 
September, Gandin was told to resist any German attempts to disarm his men, but at the 
same time was offered three choices by his German counterpart; continue fighting 
alongside the Germans, disarm peacefully, or fight. Having decided to disarm, he was faced 
with widespread opposition from his junior officers and sporadic attacks on German forces 
led to an escalation of violence between the two sides in the coming days. Faced with no 
prospect of outside help and total German air superiority, the ItalianƐ ? resistance lasted for 
around ten days before they ran out of ammunition. Approximately 1,200 were killed in the 
fighting but, on orders issued from Berlin on the same day, most of the 340 captured Italian 
officers including Gandin were summarily executed as traitors and a further communication 
ordered that no prisoners were to be taken.
43
 The result was that around 5,000 men already 
in captivity were also executed, and a further 3,000 survivors died when the transport ships 
taking them into captivity struck mines in the Adriatic.
44
 This combination of a knee-jerk 
revenge response by Berlin coupled with intransigent and obedient local German 
commanders led to this major war crime, but the Italians ? ƵƐĞĨƵůŶĞƐƐ as labour soon 
reasserted itself. On Corfu, some 600 to 700 were killed in combat or shot.
45
 Those captured 
Italians were offered the chance to join the Germans, undertake forced labour on the island 
or be shipped to German concentration camps. Most chose the second option.  On other 
Greek islands, officers were shot in large numbers, and many ordinary soldiers also lost their 
lives when transported across waters dominated by Allied air and sea power. For example, 
some 13,000 Italians on the island of Rhodes suffered this fate out of a total strength of 
around 80,000.
46
 Elsewhere, Italian units had more options, and some in Yugoslavia, Albania 
and Greece chose to join the partisans rather than surrender to the Germans. Indeed, in 
Yugoslavia almost two complete divisions defected ƚŽ ĐƌĞĂƚĞ Ă  ‘'ĂƌŝďĂůĚŝ ? ĚŝǀŝƐŝŽŶ ƚŚĂƚ
ĨŽƵŐŚƚƵŶĞĂƐŝůǇĂůŽŶŐƐŝĚĞƚŚĞzƵŐŽƐůĂǀƐƵŶƚŝůƚŚĞǁĂƌ ?ƐĞŶĚ ?47  
One of the problems for all the Italians commanders on the eve of the armistice was 
interpreting the instructions from Marshal Badoglio and his government. Efforts by the 
regime to prepare them for the surrender had only limited effects and a frustrated 
ŝƐĞŶŚŽǁĞƌ ůĂƚĞƌĐŽŵŵĞŶƚĞĚƚŚĂƚ  ‘ŝĨƚŚĞ/ƚĂůŝĂŶƌŵǇŚĂĚĚŽŶĞŝƚƐƵƚŵŽƐƚ ?ǁĞĐŽƵůĚŚĂǀĞ
had all ŽĨ/ƚĂůǇ ? ?48 This may have been fanciful as German troops had already been flooding 
into northern Italy in expectation of trouble. As it was, the Italians were only told to treat 
their former German allies as enemies on 13 September, some four days after the event.
49
 
Thus in both Corsica and Sardinia, the Italians far outnumbered the German garrisons, but 
most escaped to the mainland.
50
 More to the point, many commanders showed a lack of 
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enthusiasm for changing sides immediately, not least because few harboured anti-German 
ƐĞŶƚŝŵĞŶƚƐ ?ǁŚŝĐŚůĞĚŽŶĞŽĨŝƐĞŶŚŽǁĞƌ ?ƐĂŝĚĞƐƚŽĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞƚŚĞŵĂƐ ‘ũĞůůǇĨŝƐŚ ? ? 51   
For the approximately 3.7m Italian servicemen who ultimately fell into German 
hands, the armistice of 8 September was to have potentially serious consequences.
52
 A lack 
of leadership from the Badoglio regime and high level confusion permeated all levels of the 
Italian Army in what was now the German area of occupation. Some units reinforced their 
commitment to the Axis cause and vowed to go on fighting. This included large sections of 
the Nembo division evacuated from Sardinia and the Folgore Division that had fought at El 
Alamein.
53
 Many others chose that moment to demobilise themselves and go home, a 
process that German decrees served to reinforce.
54
 Some garrisons, such as Turin, were 
surrendered without a fight by their commanders while others put up only token resistance.  
This included the substantial forces stationed in the Italian zone of occupied France. Others 
chose a different course; interpreting BadogůŝŽ ?Ɛ ďƌŽĂĚĐĂƐƚ ƚŚĂƚ /ƚĂůŝĂŶƐ ƐŚŽƵůĚ  ‘ƌĞƐŝƐƚ Ăůů
ĂƚƚĂĐŬƐ ĨƌŽŵ ǁŚĂƚĞǀĞƌ ƋƵĂƌƚĞƌ ƚŚĞǇ  ?ƐŚŽƵůĚ ? ĐŽŵĞ ? ?  ĨĞǁ ƉůĂĐĞƐ ? DŝůĂŶ ? sĞƌŽŶĂ ĂŶĚ
Bolzano, mounted meaningful opposition but their resistance was inevitably uncoordinated 
and largely doomed to failure  W with the result that those captured were severely treated by 
the Nazis.
55
 The perpetrators were seen as having betrayed the Axis cause in its hour of 
need against Bolshevism by forcing the diversion of much-needed forces away from the 
Eastern Front. Within a week, the fifty-six divisions of the Italian Army had effectively 
ceased to exist. In the North, many soldiers had demobilised themselves, others had chosen 
to fight on for the Axis, or had thrown in their lot with the newly created Salò Republic. 
Their choices were often dictated by a mixture of personal ideology, circumstances, location 
and situation.   
ĞƌůŝŶ ?ƐƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞƚŽƚŚĞ/ƚĂůŝĂŶĐŽůůĂƉƐĞǁĂƐďƌƵƚĂů ?ďƵƚĂůƐŽƉƌĂŐŵĂƚŝĐ ?ĐŚŽŽƐŝŶŐƚŽ
remove the rebellious Italians to Germany to work in industry and agriculture in order to 
help meet the insatiable demand for labour inside the Reich. Ultimately, this included over 
600,000 former Italian servicemen who were used as forced labourers under the command 
of the OKW. Their numbers seemed to have reached a peak in February 1944 when 607,331 
were reported in this category with 454,131 employed inside the Reich, a further 33,665 in 
the General Government of Poland and another 41,320 in the occupied territories.
56
 
Numbers fluctuated as more Italians were brought under OKW control and some were then 
released to help form the armed forces of the Salò Republic. The German authorities had 
planned to spread this new source of labour across a range of employments within the 
Reich. A report for the fourth quarter of 1943 envisaged the distribution of Italians as 
follows: 
 
 
12 
 
Table 3: Employment of Italian Military Internees in the German War Economy 
     Planned  Actual 
              Autumn 1943     15 February 1944 
 
Heavy Industry      30,000    35,082 
Other War Industries   150,000  198,932 
Coal Mining     115,000  )  
        ) 38,458 
Other Mining         5,000  )  
Food Production      60,000    34,666 
Transhipment       11,000         - 
Railways       15,000    39,891 
Postal Services       10,000      3,861 
Building Industries      25,000    57,712 
Wehrmacht Transport         -      8,863 
Zivile Bedarfträger         -       8,143 
     ----------  --------- 
Total      421,000
57
  428,834
58
 
 
This would have the effect of bolstering labour supply at home and freeing up more 
Germans for service on the Eastern Front, although some Italians also volunteered for 
service in this way. While this plan of distribution did not fall easily into place, (as the actual 
figure for early 1944 show), it does give an indication of how widely and extensively the 
Italians were used in the German war economy. Indeed, as the war reached its final phases, 
these same labourers were increasingly used to clear up the immense damage done to 
major German cities by Allied bombing raids.  
Although the designation as a military internee supposedly conveyed some 
privileges, these did not really materialise for the Italians employed in the Reich. They were 
regarded as traitors to the cause by the German authorities and civilians who supervised 
them and ďƌĂŶĚĞĚĂƐ  ‘ĂĚoglio-^ĐŚǁĞŝŶĞ ? ? ĂŶ ŝŵĂŐĞthat was reinforced by the idea that 
Italy had betrayed Germany twice  W in 1915 as well as in 1943.59 Poor working conditions 
and ill treatment led to higher levels of mortality than for other comparable workers. There 
was a tension between the need to feed the workers sufficiently to maximise their 
productivity, and a desire to punish them for their betrayal. In general, workers from 
Western Europe had received better treatment than their Eastern European counterparts 
and officially, the Italians were to be treated along the same lines as Western European 
prisoners-of-war. In practice, even the rations given to the latter did not meet the basic 
provisions of the Geneva Convention but were augmented by the provision of Red Cross 
parcels  W something denied to the Italians as well as to the Russian prisoners and 
 ‘Ostarbeiter ? ?60 Moreover, it was clear that they had few friends among the other prisoners 
in the camps where they were held. As both newcomers and former enemies, they were 
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usually given short-shrift by the British, French and Soviet prisoners they encountered. A 
separate Servizio Assistenza Internati was created to meet the needs of the Italians and it 
planned to send 250 railway wagons of food a month to the camps in the Reich. In the 
event, it was able to deliver only 25% of this amount in the third quarter of 1944, and 
conditions worsened thereafter.
61
 A hierarchy was established in a Führer directive of 28 
February 1944, the so-called Leistungsernährungerlass, which stipulated the amounts of 
food to be allocated to the various groups of non-German labour then being used by the 
German war economy.
62
 While Hitler and leading Nazis had some enduring respect for 
Mussolini and for Italian fascism, and thus tried to limit the responsŝďŝůŝƚǇ ƚŽ Ă  ‘ĂĚŽŐůŝŽ
ĐůŝƋƵĞ ? ?ƚŚŝƐƐĞĞŵƐƚŽŚĂǀĞŚĂĚůŝƚƚůĞƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĂůĞĨĨĞĐƚ ?63  Some Italians were later civilianised 
which again theoretically altered their status and their treatment, but by this stage, 
conditions inside Germany had deteriorated so much that it made little difference to their 
objective circumstances.  
Less well-documented is the fate of the Italians taken prisoner on the Eastern Front 
by the Red Army and even precise numbers are difficult to establish.
64
 Moscow made the 
decision to send its Italian prisoners home on 25 August 1945. There had been attempts to 
indoctrinate and propagandise some of them in camps during the conflict, with a view to 
using them to help promote Soviet style communism in postwar Italy. However, this became 
somewhat redundant after the Potsdam Conference and the Japanese surrender when 
Stalin effectively gave up exercising influence in Italy in exchange for a free hand in Eastern 
Europe and the Balkans. By November 1946, when some 10,032 men from the Italian Army 
in Russia had been returned, the Soviets declared the process complete  W leaving around 
60,000 others assumed to have been taken prisoner unaccounted for.
65
 They became a 
major political cause in postwar Italy as families pressed for information about those still 
missing.
66
  Only in the 1990s did evidence emerge of some 64,500 Italians who had been 
captured alive by the Red Army. Some 38,000 had reportedly died in camps - amounting to 
56.5% of the total - a colossal proportion when compared to the 14% of Germans, 10.6% of 
Hungarians and 29% of Rumanians who suffered a similar fate. The Soviets had actually 
ƌĞƉĂƚƌŝĂƚĞĚ ĂƌŽƵŶĚ  ? ? ? ? ? ? ƐŽůĚŝĞƌƐ ? ďƵƚ ƚŚŝƐ ŝŶĐůƵĚĞĚŝŶ /ƚĂůŝĂŶƐ  ‘ůŝďĞƌĂƚĞĚ ? ĨƌŽŵ 'ĞƌŵĂŶ
ĐĂƉƚŝǀŝƚǇ ĚƵƌŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ZĞĚ ƌŵǇ ?Ɛ ǁĞƐƚǁĂƌĚ ĂĚǀĂŶĐĞ ǁŚŽ ǁĞƌĞ ĂůƐŽ ƐĞŶƚ to camps and 
treated as though they were prisoners of war.
67
 Such was the fate of Air Force General 
Alberto Briganti. Interned by the Germans after September 1943, he was shipped to Poland 
where he was held in a camp some 30 kilometres from Posen. When the camp was overrun 
by the Red Army, he and other Italian officers were shipped to a small town near Kharkov. In 
September 1945, he was included among 1,700 generals, officials, soldiers and civilians who 
must have been some of the first to be repatriated when they were taken by train on a 
circuitous route back to Italy.
68
  
The reasons for the abnormal mortality rate of the Italians  W abnormal even in the 
extreme circumstances of the Eastern Front - can be explained by reference to the time of 
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their capture. By the summer of 1942, the Italian VIII Army numbered some 229,000 men 
and was deployed along the Don Front.
69
 In December, a Red Army offensive broke the 
adjacent Rumanian III Army and the Italians were forced to retreat some 300 miles on foot 
with no supplies and in temperatures sometimes below -30°C.
70
 Most Italians therefore fell 
into Soviet hands at the end of 1942 and the beginning of 1943, when the Red Army was 
already swamped with prisoners after its successes at Stalingrad and its resources were 
stretched to the limit.
71
 The majority seem to have died in the early part of 1943; their 
clothing and equipment having failed to protect them from the Russian winter and 
thousands succumbed to cold, hunger, typhus and other diseases connected to 
malnutrition.
72
 In March 1943, The Italian representative in the Comintern, Vincenzo Bianco 
appealed directly to General Petrov as head of GUPVI, the administration of POW camps, in 
an attempt to save those that remained alive.
73
 He stressed their potential as converts and 
many Italians volunteered for political indoctrination on the grounds that conditions in 
these camps were appreciably better than ordinary camps. Given the apparent lack of 
resilience shown by the Italians in Russian captivity, they were ostensibly never seen as a 
major contribution to the Soviet labour force. In postwar Italy, their fate became part of a 
feud between the Communist Party on the one hand and the Army General Staff on the 
other where the former tried to blame the wartime generals (some of whom were still in 
post) for the defeat and the apparently catastrophic loss of life, while the General Staff 
countered by accusing the Soviet Union of responsibility.
74
  
 Although the Italian national narrative has tended to highlight the victimisation of its 
soldiers interned by the Germans and forced to work for the Reich over the incarceration of 
other Italians by the Allies and the Soviet Union, their circumstances and mortality rates 
were not that different from other groups who were similarly employed  W in spite of the 
disadvantages they suffered. Italian authors have suggested that 30,000-60,000 died as a 
result of their internment, but more objective surveys have discovered only 19,714 deaths 
among the whole group  W attributable to disease, industrial injuries, ill-health and bombing. 
This suggests that the real total may be in the region of 20-25,000, or around 3.5% of the 
total.
75
 This would put it more in line with the losses suffered by other Western prisoners of 
war, but nowhere near the much higher levels of mortality suffered by Russians and other 
Eastern European nationalities.  
 This last point is worthy of some further reflection. At the end of hostilities, Italy 
remained firmly in the Western camp, with Stalin having effectively given up any ambitions 
in the peninsula. The nascent Italian Republic had to establish an acceptable narrative for its 
existence within the western orbit. This involved talking up the resistance to Fascism 
(although only to an extent in order to avoid allowing communism too great a role) but also 
meant that the fate of the Italian prisoners in the hands of the western powers was 
essentially marginalised as something of an embarrassment. In contrast, the relatively small 
numbers of Italians in Soviet hands could be seen as fitting into a Cold War agenda, 
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especially as their fate was uncertain and many had not been returned at the end of 
hostilities. However, the political prominence of the Italian Communist Party in the postwar 
era prevented them from becoming too much of a political weapon, whereas the Italian 
ĨŽƌĐĞƐƐĞŝǌĞĚďǇƚŚĞ'ĞƌŵĂŶƐĐŽƵůĚďĞƐĞĞŶĂƐƌĞŝŶĨŽƌĐŝŶŐƚŚĞĐŽƵŶƚƌǇ ?ƐǀŝĐƚŝŵŝƐĂƚŝŽŶĂƚƚŚĞ
hands of the Nazis while at the same time underplaying the ĐŽƵŶƚƌǇ ?Ɛrole as an Axis ally.76  
The dispersal of Italian prisoners across five continents was undoubtedly determined 
initially by security issues, but also came to be driven by a realisation in the corridors of 
power in all belligerent states that the huge numbers of men involved could be put to good 
use in substituting for manpower that might be better employed in uniform. This dictated 
that Italians were sent to many parts of the British Empire, including the imperial 
motherland, where they were put to work in agriculture, but increasing also in industrial and 
service sector employment. Elsewhere, their use was largely in agriculture, road-building 
and forestry, as was the case for men shipped to the United States. The fate of the Italian 
military internees in German hands and their dispersal across the German Reich and some 
occupied territories is also worthy of note. Here the Germans had no compunction about 
forcibly demobilising them and thus removing any protection afforded by the Geneva 
Convention, so that they could then be used for any form of work their captors deemed 
necessary. They certainly represented a means of freeing up German labour for the armed 
forces who were suffering ever more grievous losses as the war entered its final phases. 
Indeed, for the prisoners who survived initial capture and captivity, it was the changing 
fortunes of war that dictated their experiences. While those in Western Allied hands were 
subject to ever more relaxed and liberal treatment by their captors, exactly the reverse was 
true for the Italians in German hands whose lot was dictated not only by their portrayal as 
traitors, but also by the increasing economic and social deterioration during the death-
throes of the Third Reich.  
Ultimately, the Italians in German hands were liberated either by the Red Army or by 
ŝƐĞŶŚŽǁĞƌ ?ƐĨŽƌĐes as the war came to an end. As we have seen, the Soviet Union began its 
repatriation of enemy Italian prisoners almost as soon as hostilities ended  W as did their 
American allies. For both powers, the process was largely concluded by the second half of 
1946. Only the prisoners held within the British Empire had to wait longer to be returned 
home. Problems of finding suitable shipping were cited as a reason for the delay, but in 
reality, the Italians were far too useful as a labour supply to be released quickly, and the 
final repatriations did not take place until well into 1947. In this last case, the postwar fate 
of these prisoners continued to be determined by economic imperatives, something that 
had also governed the conditions and treatment of their fellow servicemen in the hands of 
other belligerents. Thus in most cases, political and even security considerations played only 
a subordinate role in their captivity and the timing of their eventual repatriation.  
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